中国湿地生态补偿的利益博弈分析

我国采取了一系列加强湿地生态环境保护的措施,推进了湿地生态状况的改善.但在实践过程中,生态保护仍存在着结构性的政策缺位,湿地生态补偿作为调整损害与保护生态环境主体间利益关系的一种制度安排,是保护生态环境的有效措施.从博弈论的角度出发,分析湿地生态补偿的利益相关者,通过建立湿地生态补偿主体和客体的博弈模型,得出湿地生态补偿主体、客体的纳什均衡策略,并提出针对性的建议.     

基于进化博弈的生态建筑项目开发商群体行为研究

以进化博弈理论为基础,构建了开发商群体在生态建筑项目开发决策中的动态博弈模型,打破了经典博弈理论中参与人完全理性的不合理假定.模型充分讨论了政府激励措施对开发商行为的影响,其结果较好地解释了因信息不对称造成的我国生态建筑项目“市场失灵”现象,为合理引导开发商进行生态建筑项目建设提供了决策依据.     

A FRAMEWORK FOR PROCESS INDICATORS TO MONITOR FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PRACTICE TO AN URBAN WATER SYSTEM

Although very often used, the concept of sustainable development has not yet been perceived pragmatically. Due to its process nature, in this paper, we argue that sustainable development is a process in which the essential feedback loops, or Viability Loops as we name them, in the system in question are kept healthy and functional. This process deals with evolutionary changes with the end point not known in advance. According to this perception, measurement of sustainable development does not make sense. Rather, we should look for the process indicators to monitor systems for sustainable development. The purpose of the paper is to develop a methodology to deal with monitoring systems for sustainable development and its practice in an urban water system. Using a system dynamics approach, the paper adopts a systemic monitoring framework based on the idea of Viability Loops to define process indicators to monitor systems for sustainable development. To illustrate the application of the framework, its practice in the urban water system of Tehran, the capital of Iran, is provided as an example. The example of the urban water supply system of Tehran is given as a case study, albeit with some unavailable data. Here, four typical viability loops are discussed. The results of this application show that the flows of informative signals are lacking. Adopting the process indicators, we can see the gaps between the public perceptions of water abundance, the costs of water provision and energy utilizations, and what is going on in the reality are getting wider. That indicates that the viability loops are not functional enough to produce effective changes to offset the reinforcing mechanisms. The sustainable development of the system is impaired due to the persistence of those reinforcing mechanisms.     

城乡生态经济交错区农地城市流转决策博弈研究

在城市化过程中，城乡生态经济交错区的农地被占用是一种普遍现象。在我国，农地城市流转是通过土地征用而实现的，即我国农地城市流转决策属于政府行为,因此，从决策主体行为出发，研究农地城市流转，对于我国城市化的正常推进以及农地的有效保护具有重要的现实意义。研究得出，在现有的制度安排下，地方政府更加注重区域农地流转的经济发展，村干部往往是政策的执行者，而农民在决策中往往处于弱势地位，对于农地流转决策影响不大。可见，要控制农地过量向城市流转，必须树立科学的发展观，完善决策机制，规范征地行为，提高农民参与权。     

从政府与农户的动态博弈分析退耕还林工程的可持续性

退耕还林工程的实施取得了一定的成绩，但是也存在一些问题，制约了工程的可持续性。其中一个重要的原因就是补偿问题。通过经济学中的博弈理论构建退耕还林动态模型，从补偿的角度分析了退耕还林工程中存在的问题，并提出工程可持续性建议，即：①对生态林和经济林实行差别补偿；②对不同地区实行差别补偿标准；③延长补偿期限，实行分年度对农户进行不同数量的补偿；④对工程区进行产业结构调整，加强农户技能培训。     

Incorporating Evolutionary Measures into Conservation Prioritization

Abstract:  Conservation prioritization is dominated by the threat status of candidate species. However, species differ markedly in the shared genetic information they embody, and this information is not taken into account if species are prioritized by threat status alone. We developed a system of prioritization that incorporates both threat status and genetic information and applied it to 9546 species of birds worldwide. We devised a simple measure of a species' genetic value that takes into account the shape of the entire taxonomic tree of birds. This measure approximates the evolutionary history that each species embodies and sums to the phylogenetic diversity of the entire taxonomic tree. We then combined this genetic value with each species' probability of extinction to create a species-specific measure of expected loss of genetic information. The application of our methods to the world's avifauna showed that ranking species by expected loss of genetic information may help preserve bird evolutionary history by upgrading those threatened species with fewer close relatives. We recommend developing a mechanism to incorporate a species' genetic value into the prioritization framework.     

四川若尔盖湿地退化成因分析与对策研究

本文以四川若尔盖湿地为研究对象，主要贡献为：（1）应用卫星遥感数据对若尔盖湿地退化趋势进行了科学定量分析；（2）采用博弈论的分析方法对相关利益主体进行解析，在寻求利益均衡点的基础上，提出湿地保护性开发对策；（3）针对湿地退化因素提出了多种对策，其中生态移民的设想对保护四川若尔盖湿地较为适宜；（4）提出了“禁止-限制-发展”的产业结构调整思路，以指导湿地的合理开发利用。     

环境保护中政府和公众的博弈

发展经济和保护环境是现代政府治理的主要课题。环境问题越来越严峻,对公众的影响越来越深,政府和公众的环保意识不断增强,他们不断地参与到环境保护运动中。政府和公众都是理性的经济人,他们有不同的利益诉求。由于信息交流的不顺畅,政府和公众在环境保护参与中进行着博弈。在博弈的过程中,博弈的情景不断变化,政府和公众对环境问题的认知在不断地变化,他们采取的策略也不断发生变化,他们之间的博弈从合作博弈到非合作博弈再到合作博弈,不断循环,从而达到发展经济和保护环境双重目的。     

电力工业环境污染问题的博弈分析

就中国电力工业环境污染问题,在简要介绍其污染的现状和严重性及国内外研究的基础上,根据博弈论的基本原理,构建了电力工业环境污染与治理两个方面的博弈模型,旨在通过该模型分析电力工业环境污染行为产生的原因。通过对博弈模型决策问题的分析,并结合经济学原理,得出环境问题产生的根源在于环境资源的过度使用和供给的不足。最后,提出了防治电力工业环境污染相应的政策和建议,以期为加强电力工业环境管理提供参考。